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This thesis develops a process to assist military planners in assessing and
evaluating the effectiveness of land attack missiles. The aforementioned process contains
the means to address the variety of important issues and concerns that are associated with
the employment of such land attack missile systems. The Department of the Navy is
proposing a new land attack missile that will be employed by the Destroyer of the 21 st
Century (DD 21) to assist in performing Naval Surface Fire Support missions for Marines
and Army troops operating ashore. This research focuses on using the Extended Air
Defense Simulation (EADSIM) to estimate the probability of LAM survival for different
variants of land attack missiles against various threats. The analysis concludes that the
most survivable cruise missile variants have an altitude of at least 4,000 meters, speed of
at least 1,610 knots, and stealthy enough to limit the enemy air defense site detection
range to 1% of its maximum range. Survivable ballistic missile variants have a lofted
trajectory, speed in the 2,577 knot range, and stealthy enough to limit the enemy air
defense site detection range to 10% of its maximum range. The data in this thesis is from
unclassified sources, but the process can be applied with classified numerical parameters.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A new Land Attack Missile (LAM) is currently being considered by the Navy to
assist in performing Naval Surface Fire Support missions for Marines and Army troops
operating ashore. The LAM is projected to fill a void in the Naval Surface Fire Support
between the range of the gun munitions and the Marine Corps' concept of Ship to
Objective Maneuver (STOM), which calls for fire support for Marine forces taking an
objective 200 miles inland.
The LAM will have improved lethality and an expanded target set, which will
allow it to strike emerging targets to support the ground forces moving ashore. The LAM
will optimize its capability from about two hundred to three hundred nautical miles from
the ship. The LAM is projected to have the range to kill targets at the limit of the current
Ballistic Missile Treaty of 600 km, approximately 330 nm (Start I, 1991).
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a process to assist decision makers in
assessing the effectiveness of proposed variants of the Land Attack Missile (LAM). The
process will begin by identifying LAM variants, identifying a range of threats, and
running the LAM variants through the model, looking for LAM alternatives that are the
most survivable across a range of operational scenarios.
A developmental briefing at Johns Hopkins University on the Advanced Land
Attack Missile (ALAM) program revealed four initial flight profiles under consideration.





Table 1. InitialALAM Flight Profiles
The subsonic cruise flight profile is a terrain following profile with speeds less
than Mach 1 . Terrain masking is the key to making subsonic cruise missiles effective,
like the current Tomahawk cruise missile. Missiles with the supersonic and hypersonic
cruise profiles launch from a ship, proceed upward to a specified altitude above mean sea
level (MSL), fly along a specified straight path at speeds from about Mach 1 to Mach 5,
xix
and descend to the target at approximately a 45 degree dive angle. The ballistic-glide
flight profile launches from a ship and is propelled upward to its apogee altitude, based
upon the total distance from the ship to the target, then descends using gravity as its
source of acceleration.
The aforementioned missile alternatives will be designed to carry both unitary and
sub-munitions payloads. Two types of unitary warheads being considered are blast and
penetrating. Sub-munitions payloads include anti-personnel, anti-material, (dual purpose
improved conventional munition, DPICM) and anti-tank (brilliant anti-tank sensor-fused
weapon, BAT) (Mullen, 1999). This thesis focuses on the survivability of the missile
variants versus low, medium, and high threat land-based air defenses. A missile is
considered successful in this thesis if its survivability is 80%. That is, it gets through the
air defense systems and reaches the target at least 80% of the time. The data is presented
in terms of Pk, which is 1 - the probability of survival. The DoD validated model,
Extended Air Defense Simulation (EADSIM), is used to generate missile survivability
data. Nearly 20,000 simulated LAM attacks were used to generate the insights. For all
of the scenarios, we assume an alerted threat with a perfect state of readiness for enemy
air defense sites.
The low threat scenario is vulnerable to both cruise and ballistic missile LAM
variants. As the altitude and speed variables increase, the probability the LAM is killed
by an enemy air defense site, Pk, decreases in the cruise missile variants. The most
preferred ballistic missile variants in the low threat scenario have a depressed trajectory
and a small detection range. As expected, many combinations of cruise and ballistic
missiles penetrate the enemy air defenses in the low threat scenario. All the
combinations that have Pk values less than or equal to 0.2, i.e., are at least 80%
survivable, are listed in Appendices C and D.
In the medium threat scenario the acceptable cruise missile LAM variants fly
above 3,000 meters and at least 1,933 knots. As altitude and speed increase, the
survivability of the LAM increases for the medium threat level cruise missiles. The
ballistic missile variants, like the low threat scenario, are more survivable when the LAM
variant has a depressed trajectory and a low detection range.
xx
The high threat scenario presents many problems for cruise and ballistic missile
LAMs. A majority of the cruise and ballistic missiles are killed in all the replications.
The alerted, modern, integrated air defense is only penetrated by very stealthy cruise
missiles with a detection range value of 1% and a speed of at least 1,933 knots, depressed
trajectory ballistic missiles with a detection range value less than 10%, or lofted
trajectory ballistic missiles.
In the low and medium threat scenario, higher altitudes and faster speeds increase
the probability of survival for the LAM variants. In the high threat scenario, only
excursion runs with an extremely low detection range of 1% make it through the air
defenses.
The ballistic missile LAM variants are successful in the low and medium threat
scenarios when the detection range is 50% or lower for depressed trajectories, or when a
lofted trajectory is used. The high threat scenario is only defeated when the LAM has a
lofted trajectory and a detection range of 10% or lower. Speed is not a factor in the
ballistic missile LAMs tested.
The high threat scenario proves to be the most difficult set of air defenses to
penetrate. This is not surprising, but does indicate that a sophisticated missile must be
used to achieve successful target destruction. The sign test confirms that the threat level
of the scenario does make a difference in the success, or failure, of the LAM. The most
survivable cruise missile LAM variants have an altitude of at least 4,000 meters, speed of
at least 1,610 knots (Mach 2.3), and stealthy enough to limit the enemy air defense site
detection range to 1% of its maximum range. Survivable ballistic missile LAM variants
have a lofted trajectory, speed in the 2,577 knot (Mach 4.0) range, and stealthy enough to
limit the enemy air defense site detection range to 10% of its maximum range.
xxi
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Military planners need tools to continually assess and evaluate the effectiveness
of future combat systems. These planning tools must contain the means to address the
variety of important issues and concerns that are associated with the employment of the
systems. One such system being proposed by the Department of the Navy is a new land
attack missile that will be employed by the Destroyer of the 21 st Century (DD 21). DD
21 is projected to have an initial operating capability in 2010. (Bohmfalk, 2000)
Aside from air power, the Department of Defense (DoD) currently has the
Tomahawk missile for use in long-range land attack operations and the Army Tactical
Missile System (ATACMS) for shorter-range land attack operations. The ATACMS
must be ground-deployed, while the Tomahawk can be fired from a ship.
The Surface Navy currently has several projects underway to enhance its land
attack capability to support operations and the Navy and Marine Corps' concepts of
Forward From the Sea and Operational Maneuver From the Sea, respectively. The
traditional Naval Gun is being upgraded. The Extended Range Gun Munition (ERGM) is
being introduced on newly commissioned Arleigh Burke class destroyers to increase
Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) to a range of about 60 miles (Seigle, 1999). A more
advanced and longer-range system, the Advanced Gun System (AGS), will be
incorporated into DD 2 1 . (Dalton, 1994)
Another one of these projects is to create a variant of the current Tomahawk
cruise missile, which will be called Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM). The TACTOM will
be a loitering cruise missile that can be given new targeting information while in flight.
Yet another project is the Land Attack Standard Missile (LASM), which is the first phase
in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for a Land Attack Missile (LAM). It
will be a low cost alteration to the current Standard Missile 2 (SM-2) and will possess a
short-range land attack capability. (Mullen, 1999)
B. OVERVIEW
A new Land Attack Missile (LAM) is currently being considered by the Navy to
assist in performing Naval Surface Fire Support missions for Marines and Army troops
operating ashore. The LAM is projected to fill a void in the Naval Surface Fire Support
between the range of the gun munitions and the Marine Corps
1
concept of Ship to
Objective Maneuver (STOM), which calls for fire support for Marine forces taking an
objective 200 miles inland.
The LAM will have improved lethality and an expanded target set, which will
allow it to strike emerging targets to support the ground forces moving ashore. The LAM
will optimize its capability from about two hundred to three hundred nautical miles from
the ship. The LAM is projected to have the range to kill targets at the limit of the current
Ballistic Missile Treaty of 600 km, approximately 330 nm (Start I, 1991).
C. OBJECTIVE
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a process to assist decision makers in
assessing the survivability of proposed variants of the Land Attack Missile (LAM). The
process will begin by identifying LAM variants, identifying a range of threats, and
running the model across the LAM variants looking for LAM alternatives that are the
most survivable across a range of operational scenarios. For this thesis, a successful
LAM will have a probability of survival of 80%.
A developmental briefing at Johns Hopkins University on the Advanced Land
Attack Missile (ALAM) program revealed four initial flight profiles under consideration.





Table 2. Initial ALAM Flight Profiles
The subsonic cruise flight profile is a terrain following profile with speeds less
than Mach 1. Terrain masking is the key to making subsonic cruise missiles survivable,
like the current Tomahawk cruise missile. The supersonic and hypersonic cruise profile
missiles launch from a ship, proceed upward to a specified altitude above mean sea level
(MSL), fly along a specified straight path at speeds from about Mach 1 to Mach 5, and
descend to the target at approximately a 45 degree dive angle. The LAMs with a
ballistic-glide flight profile launch from a ship and are propelled upward to their apogee
altitude, based upon the total distance from the ship to the target, then descend using
gravity as their source of acceleration.
The aforementioned missile alternatives will be designed to carry both unitary and
sub-munitions payloads. Two types of unitary warheads being considered are blast and
penetrating. Sub-munitions payloads include anti-personnel, anti-material, (dual purpose
improved conventional munition, DPICM) and anti-tank (brilliant anti-tank sensor-fused
weapon, BAT) (Mullen, 1999). This thesis focuses on the survivability of the missile
variants versus low, medium, and high threat land-based air defenses. The DoD validated
model, Extended Air Defense Simulation (EADSIM), is used to generate missile
survivability data.
D. EADSIM BACKGROUND
According to Mark McAnally, the Chief Engineer of EADSIM at Teledyne
Brown Engineering, accreditations by joint and service organizations have been
performed, including the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and the
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program. Verification and Validation
efforts have been conducted by many organizations, including USSTRATCOM,
AFOTEC, JSF. SMART, USASMDC, BMDO, and others. EADSIM has undergone a
number of examinations by users and has completed a Level 1 confidence assessment as
part of the BMDO Analytic Tool Box. A multi-service assessment has been performed
several times and the EADSIM program is ISO 9001 certified. (McAnally, 2000)
EADSIM is a stochastic mission-level simulation model developed by Teledyne
Brown Engineering and is currently managed by the U.S. Army Strategic Defense
Command (SDC) in Huntsville, Alabama. Many detailed inputs, such as radar
frequencies, missile probabilities of kill, and reaction times, are used to determine the
outcome of each scenario. EADSIM is ideally suited for a detailed in-depth study of a
raid on integrated air defenses and was used to extensively model DESERT SHIELD and
DESERT STORM. (Case, 1995)
E. RESEARCH
1. Phase One
The research is divided into two phases. Phase one consists of building the
simulation in EADSIM. Unclassified data for the enemy air defenses is entered and
enemy systems are created. These systems are then deployed in an enemy laydown
configuration in EADSIM using generic enemy defensive strategies. The subsonic,
supersonic, and hypersonic cruise LAMs are launched from a simulated DD 21
approximately 20 miles offshore. These LAM variants have preplanned waypoints and
routes similar to those of the current Tomahawk cruise missile, except these routes force
the LAM to fly directly through the strength of the enemy air defenses with minimal
terrain masking. This ensures the data is from a "worst case" scenario. That is, we
expect better results, i.e., higher survivability, in actual conditions.
The ballistic-glide LAMs are also launched from the same simulated DD 21
offshore and follow either a depressed trajectory flight path or a lofted trajectory flight
path. The depressed trajectory flight path ensures the LAM variants do not exceed
current realistic apogee altitudes on their path to the target. There is much debate
between the services on how to deconflict a missile flying through high altitude airspace,
so the lofted trajectory may not be a feasible option. The lofted trajectory flight path is
4
included in order to obtain possible results. The lofted trajectory allows the missile to
have approximately an 80-degree dive angle on the target, whereas the depressed
trajectory has a dive angle between 20 - 25 degrees. Once again, the flight paths are
routed through the teeth of the enemy air defenses (CNA, 1992).
2. Phase Two
Phase two consists of parametrically varying key factors and analyzing the
statistical results of the different LAM variants run through the scenarios. This includes
statistical hypothesis tests to determine if differences are statistically significant. The
objective is to find the LAM variant that has the highest survivability against each and/or
all of the enemy air defenses. The Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) is the probability the
LAM survives to its intended target. It is measured statistically with Pk, where k is killed
by an enemy air defense site. If the LAM is 80% survivable, it has a Pr value of 0.2. A
lower MOE value represents a more effective LAM variant since the goal is to maximize
survivability and minimize enemy air defense site lethality. The Measure of Performance
(MOP) is the probability the LAM is engaged (Pe) by an enemy air defense site. S-Plus
2000 and Microsoft Excel are the data analysis tools used in the parametric analysis of
the data (MathSoft, 1999).
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II. METHODS
A. RESEARCH
Different threat levels of air defense systems and variations of the LAM are
simulated using the Extended Air Defense Simulation (EADSIM). There are three
different threat levels of enemy air defenses: low, medium, and high. Each level of
enemy air defense is completely independent from the others and referred to as a scenario
in EADSIM. Each scenario consists of a friendly (blue) laydown, an enemy (red)
laydown, and an associated Detailed Terrain and Elevation Data (DTED) image of the
terrain. Laydown refers to the specific layout of the systems in the scenario, whether
they are complex, like an air defense site, or simple, like a target area. In EADSIM,
different laydowns can be placed on top of the terrain to make a complete picture of all
the systems in the scenario.
Every ship, cruise missile, ballistic missile, enemy air defense site, and target has
to be created in EADSIM, in order to be used in any scenario. Each ship, cruise missile,
and enemy air defense site is considered a system in EADSIM. The individual systems
consist of their own sensors, rule sets, and weapons. So, for instance, each enemy air
defense site type, whether it is an anti-aircraft gun, surface-to-air missile launcher, or a
combination of both, must have at least one sensor, rule set, and weapon entered and
saved. Eleven different enemy air defense site systems were created for this thesis. The
ballistic missiles are considered weapons in EADSIM and the targets are placed in the
scenario at an arbitrary position from the DD 21. (Teledyne Brown, 1998)
Only scenarios involving a single missile, whether it is a ballistic or a cruise
missile, are run. No suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) by friendly aircraft or
special operations teams is taken into account. The cruise missiles use only four
waypoints en route to the target. This minimizes terrain masking and known air defense
site avoidance procedures, which are necessary for subsonic missiles to survive. The
ballistic missiles are difficult to model explicitly and change dramatically in apogee





The friendly (blue) laydown consists of a blue destroyer ship icon that represents
a DD 21. The DD 21 is the launching platform for all the cruise and ballistic missile
LAMs. The cruise and ballistic missiles are modeled differently in EADSIM. so a
separate scenario is built for each. Hence, there are low threat, medium threat, and high
threat cruise scenarios, along with low, medium, and high threat ballistic scenarios. The
only difference between the blue laydown in the scenarios is the way in which the LAM
is modeled.
2. Enemy
The second part of each scenario is the enemy (red) laydown. Each of the three
threat levels corresponds to differing levels of enemy air defenses, to include such things
as defense in depth, and overlapping sensor coverage. The idea is that the LAM would
be a missile used against various threats without modifying the missile, other than
possibly the warhead, between applications. Each of the laydowns is very different
depending on whether it is the low, medium, or high enemy threat.
c. LOW THREAT
The low threat enemy laydown shown in Figure 1, consists of basic anti-aircraft
guns spread out sporadically along the LAM's flight path to the target. The anti-aircraft
guns are unclassified versions of some older Russian models that are available to any
third world nation for the right price. Each model of anti-aircraft gun is entered into
EADSIM by using the appropriate sensors, weapons, rule sets, and systems. The DD 21
in the low scenario is 50 kilometers, 27 nautical miles, offshore. The low threat target is
approximately 300 kilometers, 162 nautical miles, from the ship.
Figure 1. Detailed Terrain Image of the Low Threat Scenario Showing DD 21
Launching Platform, Cruise Missile Flight Path, Enemy Air Defense Sites, and Hostile
Target

Figure 2 shows a closer image of the target area and the air defenses surrounding
it. The cruise missile's path is shown with white dashed lines, while the hostile target is
represented by the yellow star with the word "HOSTILE" next to it. The enemy air
defense sites are depicted in different colors to represent different capabilities of the
systems.
Figure 2. Close-Up Image of the Medium Threat Scenario Showing the Terminal




The medium threat enemy laydown displayed below in Figure 3, features basic
anti-aircraft guns, older, less-capable Russian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, and
hand-held surface-to-air missile launchers, commonly referred to as manned portable air
defense systems (MANPADS). The systems are spread out, but grouped to imply some
coordination, along the LAM's flight path to the target. The anti-aircraft guns are the
same as the ones used in the low threat scenario. The SAMs and MANPADs are
unclassified versions of older Russian models that are for sale to any nation. Each model
of anti-aircraft gun, surface-to-air missile, or MANPAD was entered into EADSIM by
using the appropriate sensors, weapons, rule sets, and systems described previously. The
DD 21 in the medium scenario is 80 kilometers, 43 nautical miles, offshore. The medium
threat target is approximately 270 kilometers, 148 nautical miles, from the ship.
Figure 3. Detailed Terrain Image of the Medium Threat Scenario Showing DD 21




Figure 4 shows the target area and its surrounding air defense sites. The cruise
missile enters from the left part of the figure and proceeds to the hostile target unless it is
shot down.
Figure 4. Close-Up Image of the Medium Threat Scenario Showing the Terminal




The high threat enemy laydown illustrated in Figure 5, consists of basic anti-
aircraft guns, older Russian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, newer Russian
surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and hand-held surface-to-air missile launchers
(MANPADS) grouped along the LAM's flight path to the target. The air defenses are
placed to protect the target as if it were something as important as a theater ballistic
missile site, command post, or headquarters building, since the LAM's proposed mission
is to attack a variety of moving or stationary targets. The air defense weapons are the
same as the low and medium threat laydowns with the addition of a couple of
unclassified Russian SAM systems upgrades. Again, each model of anti-aircraft gun,
SAM, or MANPAD was entered into EADSIM by using the appropriate sensors,
weapons, rule sets, and systems described previously. The DD 21 in the high threat
scenario is 120 kilometers, 65 nautical miles, offshore. The high threat target is
approximately 540 kilometers, 292 nautical miles, from the ship.
Figure 5. Detailed Terrain Image of the High Threat Scenario Showing DD 21




Figure 6 reveals a closer look at the tight defenses around the intended hostile
target, represented by a yellow star, in the high threat scenario. The cruise missile's
flight path is the white dotted line entering from the bottom of the Figure and traversing
through the air defense sites to the hostile target. Each different color represents a
different type of air defense site.
Figure 6. Close-Up Image of the High Threat Scenario Showing the Terminal Cruise




For each scenario, a variation of the LAM is run against each threat level thirty
times. This allows us decent power in detecting alternatives so we can invoke the Central
Limit Theorem, i.e., a normal approximation (Devore, 1995). The LAM has three
primary independent variables that were altered. For the cruise missile variations, these
independent variables are altitude, speed, and stealth. The ballistic missile LAM variants
substitute trajectory for altitude.
1. Altitude
Altitude is varied differently for each speed category. The subsonic speed
category has an initial lower bound of 50 meters above ground level (AGL) and is
incremented to 100 meters above ground level, then by 100 meters to an upper bound of
600 meters AGL. In order to simulate the flight profile of a subsonic missile deploying
BAT munitions, a popup terminal maneuver from the original altitude to 1,800 meters
(6,000 feet) is performed. This maneuver was added to ensure the change in radar cross
section is accounted for in these low altitude runs.
The bounds on the supersonic and hypersonic cruise flight profiles are
incremented every 1,000 meters, beginning at 1,000 meters above mean sea level (MSL)
and continuing to 6.000 meters MSL. MSL is used instead of AGL because super and
hypersonic speed LAMs would not be able to control their altitude enough to make use of
any terrain following. Furthermore, none of the examined LAM's routes forces it to fly
through uneven terrain features.
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Table 2 below shows all the test altitudes for the simulation runs in each scenario
of the cruise missile LAM variants.








Supersonic and Hypersonic 1,000 3,280
Supersonic and Hypersonic 2,000 6,562
Supersonic and Hypersonic 3,000 9,842
Supersonic and Hypersonic 4,000 13,123
Supersonic and Hypersonic 5,000 16,404
Supersonic and Hypersonic 6,000 19,685
Table 3. Flight Profiles and Altitudes Used to Test LAM Variants.
2. Trajectory
The ballistic flight profile cannot be modified for both the altitude and the speed
variables simultaneously. As a result, the altitude for the ballistic flight profile is divided
into two trajectories, depressed and lofted. The depressed and lofted trajectories are
varied in each scenario because of the distance from the DD 21 to the target. The
depressed LAM's apogee altitude ranges from a lower bound of 25,000 meters MSL
(roughly 82,000 ft.) to a maximum upper bound of 33,000 meters MSL (roughly 108,000
ft.). The lofted trajectory LAM's apogee altitude ranges from a lower bound of 490,000
meters MSL (roughly 1,600,000 ft. or 304 mi.) to a maximum upper bound of 810,000
meters MSL (roughly 2,659,818 ft. or 504 mi.).
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Tables 3 and 4 below depict the different trajectories and their average apogees, in
meters, and dive angle, for each scenario threat level. The depressed trajectory keeps the







Low Threat 31,000 101,705 25
Medium Threat 25,700 84,317 23
High Threat 33,000 108,267 20
Table 4. Apogees and Dive Anglesfor the Depressed Trajectory Ballistic Missiles.
The lofted trajectories are included in Table 4, but are very speculative in nature
because of how high the apogee altitude is. The steeper terminal dive angle in the lofted
trajectories, however, is better for LAM survivability. The steep dive angle prohibits
detection of the missile because it exceeds the capabilities of most enemy surface-to-air
missile systems and reduces time needed to acquire, track, and fire by the enemy SAM
systems.
Scenario Lofted (meters) Depressed (feet) Dive Angle (degrees)
Low Threat 622,000 2,040,676 83
Medium Threat 491,000 1,610,888 80
High Threat 808,000 2,650,911 80
Table 5. Apogees and Dive Anglesfor the Lofted Trajectory Ballistic Missiles.
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3. Speed
The second independent variable is speed. Four general speed categories are a
part of the speed independent variable. The speed categories are subsonic, supersonic,
ballistic, and hypersonic. Subsonic refers to speeds less than Mach 1, and supersonic
refers to speeds between Mach 1 and Mach 4. Ballistic refers to speeds around Mach 4,
and hypersonic refers to speeds above Mach 5. The subsonic, supersonic, and hypersonic
category missiles are modeled as cruise missiles, while the ballistic speed category
missiles are modeled as ballistic missiles. The simulation test speeds are shown in Table
5 below.
Classification Mach Knots Meters/Second
Subsonic .65 420 216
Subsonic .9 580 298
Supersonic 1.5 966 497
Supersonic 2.5 1,610 828
Supersonic 3.0 1,933 994
Supersonic 3.5 2,255 1,160
Ballistic 4.0 2,577 1,326
Ballistic 4.5 2,899 1,492
Hypersonic 5.0 3,221 1,657
Hypersonic 5.5 3,544 1,823
Table 6. Simulation Test Speeds Displaying Speed Category in Mach, Knots, and
Meters per Second.
4. Stealth
The third independent variable is stealth. Stealth, in general, refers to radar cross-
section (RCS) and infrared (IR) signature. Detection ranges are altered to represent a
lower or higher RCS and/or IR signature. There are four categories for detection ranges
indicated by percentages of the maximum detection range of the enemy sensor: 100%,
50%, 25%, and 10%.
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G. SIMULATION RUNS
In order to run a different altitude variation in EADSIM for the subsonic,
supersonic and hypersonic speeds, the cruise missile is edited for each different scenario.
This includes changing the missile's altitude, speed, and terminal waypoints. The
waypoints are set up to ensure a basic, but feasible, route is used. The first waypoint is
set on the forward portion of the DD 21 at sea level, in order to represent a vertical
launching system (VLS). The second waypoint is positioned between 1,000 - 2,000
meters from the DD 21 along the direct path to the target, at the altitude the LAM variant
is supposed to have for the cruise portion of its flight. The third waypoint is modified to
roughly simulate a 45-degree terminal dive angle to the intended target. The fourth and
terminal waypoint is set either on the target or 1,800 meters above the target if the
missile's flight path is lower than the needed altitude for BAT munition dispersal. The
"popup" terminal maneuver is important to include in order to ensure that the enemy air
defense sites have an opportunity to see any changes in the LAM's RCS as it rises to its
dispersal altitude. If the flight path is above 1,800 meters, the BAT munitions will be
dispersed as the missile passes through 1,800 meters, so the dive angle is unchanged.
The ballistic missile is modified in EADSIM by changing the amount of thrust
and dry weight from the generic missile resident in EADSIM. Each trajectory and speed
requires additional changes to the missile, since each scenario has the DD 21 a different
range from the target. It is evident that the distance from the target directly influences the
trajectory of the LAM. These differences are clearly seen in the apogee altitudes for each
scenario shown previously in Tables 3 and 4.
EADSIM estimates the probability of survival for the various LAM alternatives as
a function of the factors listed: altitude, speed, flight profile, detection range, and threat
level. Statistics on the LAM's survivability are gathered and parametrically analyzed.
The statistics include the probability the LAM is engaged by an air defense site, Pe and
the probability the LAM is killed by any air defense site, Pk, aggregated for each LAM
variant that is run thirty times using the Monte Carlo simulation capability in EADSIM.
A script written by Michael Monius of the Joint Warfare Analysis Division at the Johns
Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab extracts the relevant data and imports it into a
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text file. The text file is then opened in Microsoft Excel and a macro is recorded that
extracts the lines of data that includes the scenario name, altitude, speed, detection range,
Pe , and Pk for each of the 650 combinations (Walkenbach, 2000). Each line of data
consists of 30 trials for each of the combinations for a total of almost 20,000 runs. The




There are several expected results from this thesis. The first is to establish a
process to evaluate LAM survivability. The process is available for the Department of
the Navy to use in their Analysis of Alternatives for the LAM. The process is established
by defining what the elements and steps of the process are. Each step is defined in detail
below. Finally, a wire diagram of the process is displayed to make it simple to see the
flow of the process.
The second result is the analysis of the parametric data generated from the
multiple EADSIM run combinations. The analysis looks for the important factors of
LAM survivability and identifies where changing the independent variables no longer has
much of an effect on missile survivability. Each of the independent variables, altitude or
trajectory, speed, and stealth is discussed in terms of the MOE, P^ It is important to
understand that Pk is the probability the enemy air defense site kills the LAM, so the
probability the LAM survives is 1- Pk.
Probability of engagement, Pe , is the MOP that was originally going to be used to
help understand the MOE, Pk. After reviewing the relationships between the independent
variables and Pe , it is apparent Pe is not helpful in predicting Pk- The values are skewed
because the Pe is the average measured across all enemy air defense sites within the
scenario. If the first site destroys the LAM, the later sites cannot engage the LAM. In
many of the cases reviewed, the earlier sites did destroy the LAM and, therefore, skew
the Pe values, making them lower than if the LAM made it through all the air defenses.
Thus, Pe , as calculated in this thesis, is not a good MOP for this thesis.
The discussion centers on regression data with a smoothing spline line to display
trends. After the discussion of the single independent variables with respect to Pk is
complete, interaction terms are displayed and discussed using contour and box plots. The
contour plots contain two of the variables on the x and y-axes and display contours in
terms of Pk- The box plots display the middle 50% of the data, the median, and the
interquartile range.
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A. ESTABLISHING THE PROCESS
The process is constructed by merging logical data analysis steps with the
multiple steps required in EADSIM to construct a new scenario. Figure 7 illustrates the
basic steps required to create this process. Each of the seven steps in the process is
discussed in greater detail below.
Define the Threat
Candidate Systems












-> Compare and Contrast Cases
Run Excursions
View Results
Figure 7. Wire Diagram Showing the Different Stages ofthe Process.
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1. Defining the Threat
The first link of the process is defining the threats. In this research, the threat is
classified as low. medium, and high. As described in the introduction, the low threat is
defined as any third world country with older defensive systems. The medium threat is
characterized by a more developed nation with a mixture of older and newer, more
capable defensive systems. Finally, the high threat is a completely integrated defensive
system that consists of the latest and greatest in defensive systems and their coordination
amongst one another. In all cases, we assume an alerted threat with all systems 100%
operational.
2. Candidate Systems
The second element of the process is evaluating the candidate systems. Each
enemy air defense system consists of sensors, weapons, and rule sets. A sensor contains
options for each of the detection criteria in a typical radar. These include sweep rate,
slew rate, detection gates for absolute speed and altitude, field of view, azimuth,
elevation, frequency and bandwidth. The weapons portion has lethality restrictions, like
Pk percentage and lethal radius, along with maximum range values, maximum velocity
values, launch constraints, and intercept constraints. Finally, the rule sets are specific to
each operational phases of the engagement. These phases include target selection,
launch, intercept, and reload. The mean and deviation of the phase timing are options
included in these operational phases of EADSIM (Teledyne Brown, 1998).
3. Building the Scenario in EADSIM
The next step in establishing the process is to build the scenarios in EADSIM.
Each scenario has terrain data imported, in this case, from a Detailed Terrain and
Elevation Data, DTED, library at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.
The blue, friendly, and red, enemy, laydowns are built using the systems chosen in step
two of the process. Each of these laydowns contains the systems and is represented by
colored icons chosen by the person creating the scenario. In the cruise missile cases, the
routes and waypoints are added. Similarly, in the ballistic missile cases, the ballistic
missiles are created using the generic parameters available as the default cases in
EADSIM (Teledyne Brown, 1998).
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4. Run Baseline Cases
A run matrix is created using any available guidelines or specifications. This
thesis incorporates several ideas that the Advanced Land Attack Missile program office,
and Johns Hopkins University APL have generated. For the cruise missile cases, the
waypoints, altitudes, and speeds are changed for each specific LAM variant and
simulated 30 times. The ballistic missile cases are changed from the generic ballistic
missile case in EADSIM to accommodate different distances to the target, trajectories,
and speeds.
5. Compare and Contrast Cases
For each set of 30 simulations, the data on all the engagements is gathered in
EADSIM. A script written in UNIX extracts the data from EADSIM and creates a
generic text file. A cursory review of the data is conducted for the text files. If any of the
specific runs contain curious or interesting data, the run is looked at in more detail in
EADSIM. EADSIM allows the user to view each run of the group of 30 by itself.
Reviewing the run allows the user to see each enemy air defense sensor acquisition and
weapon engagement on the LAM graphically, similar to what Figures 1, 3, and 5 depict.
At any time during the run, the perspective can be zoomed in or out and the playback can
be paused for distance measurements to ensure the scenario is working properly
(Teledyne Brown, 1998). Then, the data is imported into Microsoft Excel and a macro is
run to average the Pe and Pk values over the 30 simulations (Walkenbach, 2000). The
data is subsequently compiled into a single spreadsheet with all the pertinent data to this
thesis, for easier viewing. These values are imported into S-Plus 2000 as data sets for
parametric analysis, displaying various graphs and calculating hypothesis tests.
6. Run Excursions
Excursions may need to be run if interesting or unexplainable breakpoints are
found when comparing and contrasting the baseline cases. Excursions allow the analyst
to narrow the focus on the independent variables in question and then run them through
EADISM again. If excursions are run, we go back to step 5 of the process.
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7. Results
After all the excursions are run, we analyze the results in detail, record the results,
and report any conclusions found.
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B. ANALYSIS OF THE PARAMETRIC DATA
After the process is defined, data is tested to verify that the process works. As
discussed, the data is entered into EADSIM scenarios and run using a Monte Carlo
simulation with 30 replications. For example, one of the specific LAM variants
replicated 30 times in each threat level scenario has the parameters of 1000 meters in
altitude. Mach 3.0, and 100% of the maximum detection range for all specific enemy air
defense sites. The analysis is grouped according to the independent variables with each
threat level scenario usually represented in graphical form. Altitude, trajectory, speed,
and stealth are the groupings, followed by the interactions between them.
The analysis is a combination of graphical regressions with spline smoothers,
contour plots, and box plots. The raw data is also an integral part of the analysis, but
only displayed if no regression or plot shows anything significant. Hypothesis tests are
used to determine relationships between independent variables and the response
variables, Pe and P^.
Graphical regressions show all the groups of 30 runs together on axes that have
the same scale. In addition to the regression graph, spline smoothers are included on the
graphs to reveal trends in the data. The smoothing splines in S-PLUS are cubic equations
computed by putting together a sequence of local cubic polynomials (MathSoft, 1999).
Contour plots are flat two-dimensional representations of three-dimensional data.
The lines on the contour plot indicate locations of equal magnitude, in our case Pk.
Contour plots show maxima and minima along with the slope of the surface in different
regions on the plot. The closer together the lines are, the steeper the slope is. (MathSoft,
1999)
Box plots graphically display the median and interquartile range (IQR) of the
data. The IQR is the middle 50% of the data, meaning all the data from the first quartile
to the third quartile. Vertical lines from the IQR extend to adjacent values, but not more
than 1 .5 IQR beyond the quartiles. Any outliers are graphed individually as small circles
beyond the vertical lines. (Hamilton, 1992)
26
1. Altitude (Cruise Missiles Only)
Altitude is the first independent variable that is discussed. It is only valid for the
cruise missile LAM variants, because trajectory is used in the ballistic missile LAM
variants. Figure 8 shows Pk versus altitude for the low, medium, and high threat level
scenarios in a single smoothing spline plot. The symbols represent various speeds and
detection ranges.
Recalling from Table 2, the altitudes ranged from 50-600 meters for the subsonic
runs. These are grouped together in Figure 8 in the upper left hand corner with high
probabilities of kill, Pk. The lower altitudes, and subsequent slower speeds on the




The low threat scenario is the only break from the steady 1 .0 Pk in these subsonic
runs, which is a direct reflection of the simplicity of its enemy air defenses. Figure 8
displays decreasing Pk as altitude increases for the low and medium scenarios. Both
smoothing splines for the low and medium scenarios stop decreasing rapidly at greater
than 4,000 meters in altitude, suggesting 4,000 meters is a possible transition point for the
low and medium threat level scenarios. This finding is contrary to intuition and may be
due to the lack of terrain masking that normally allows lower altitude cruise missiles to
successfully make it to the target. In the high threat level scenario, however, no cruise
missile variant is successful on its own against an alerted, ready threat.
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Figure 8. Pk versus Altitude For All Cruise Missiles For the Three Threat Levels. No
Cruise Missiles Penetrated the High Threat Level Air Defenses.
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Since all the subsonic runs are grouped together with a high probability that they
are killed by enemy air defenses, they are removed in Figure 9. When the subsonic runs
are removed, the spline smoother forms gradual curves for the low and medium threat
level scenarios with an apparent maximum inflection at about 4,000 meters. The high
threat still remains constant with a Pk of 1.0, while the medium scenario decreases
monotonically from 0.65 to 0.3 Pk and the low scenario decreases from 0.4 to 0.05 Pk.
Similar to Figure 8, Pk continues to decrease as altitude increases for the low and medium
threat scenarios, while the high threat scenario, again, remains constant.
































Figure 9. Pk versus Altitude For Supersonic and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles. The Low




2. Trajectory (Ballistic Missiles Only)
Trajectory is used as a substitute for altitude in the ballistic missile scenarios.
Trajectory is significant in only some of the scenarios. In the low and medium threat
scenarios, the depressed trajectory scenarios have lower Pk values than the lofted
trajectory scenarios. This may only be a result of the stochastic modeling. The results in
the low and medium scenarios are in direct contrast to the results of the high threat
scenario, as illustrated in Table 7. The lofted trajectory is favorable in the high threat
scenario. This may be because of the steep dive angle (between 80 - 83 degrees) of the
LAM. The steep dive angle limits the amount of time the LAM is "in the envelope" of
the air defense site. The low and medium threat scenarios contain fewer air defense sites
that can detect and fire upon the LAM because of the nature of the speed and trajectory of
a ballistic missile. This may explain the apparent indifference to the depressed and lofted
trajectories. Table 7 below shows the average Pk values for the depressed and lofted
trajectories in each threat level.
Scenario Depressed Lofted
Low Threat 0.1075 0.1625
Medium Threat 0.1888 0.2675
High Threat 1.0 0.345





Speed is the next independent variable discussed. It is valid for both the cruise
and ballistic missile LAM variants. We again look at regression data fitted with a spline
smoother for the low, medium, and high threat level scenarios.
a) Cruise Missiles
Figure 10 is the aggregation of all the threat levels in one figure. It is the
graph of Pk versus speed for all the cruise missile replications. It illustrates the general
idea of Pr decreasing as speed increases. This supports logical conclusions about speed
and LAM survivability. As the speed increases, enemy air defense sites have less
reaction time and can fire fewer SAMs at the inbound LAM. We also see from Figure 1
that the data points vary greatly in their range of Pk. The smoothing spline line begins at
1 .0 Pk when speed is a subsonic 460 knots and ends at 0.4 Pk when speed is a hypersonic
3,544 knots. Because of the varying range of the response variable, each scenario is
separated.
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Because each scenario is presented individually in Figure 1 1, it is easy to
see how the high threat scenario inflated the smoothing spline Pk values in Figure 10.
The low threat level scenario starts with a Pk of 0.93 at 460 knots and decreases to about
0.07 Pk at 3,544 knots. The medium scenario starts with a Pk of 1.0 at the 460, 580, and
966-knot speeds, which are hidden behind the high threat scenario red squares, and ends
with 0.2 Pk. The low and medium threat level scenarios illustrated in Figure 1 1 appear to
have breakpoints in their respective Pk curves around the supersonic 1,933 knots (Mach
3.0) and 2,255 knots (Mach 3.5) speeds. Additionally, as expected, the Pk values for the
low scenario remains less than Pk for the medium scenario throughout the range of
speeds. The high threat scenario, however, remains unchanged with a Pk of 1 .0.
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Figure 11. Pk versus Speed For All Cruise Missiles. As Speed Increases, LAM
Survivability Increases For the Low and Medium Threat Levels.
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When the subsonic runs are deleted, the low threat scenario smoothing
spline flattens out quite a bit. In Figure 11, the beginning Pk value is greater than 0.9,
while in Figure 12 below, it is reduced to 0.4 Pr. The medium threat scenario depicts a
much more pronounced "knee" at the supersonic speed of 2,255 knots than the gradual
descent in Figure 1 1 with the subsonic runs included. The high threat scenario remains
constant with a 1.0 Pr. The medium threat scenario triangles at 966 knots are hidden
behind the high threat red square at 1 .0 Pk.
All the regressions run with speed as the individual variable versus Pr
show that subsonic speeds have very high Pk values. As modeled in this thesis, subsonic
speed LAMs have a low probability of survival against any threat level of enemy air
defense because terrain-masking and air defense site avoidance techniques are not
modeled.
Pk vs Speed For Supersonic and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles
Q.
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Figure 12. Pk versus Speed For Supersonic and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles. The Low




Because the ballistic missile runs have only two speeds, a box plot of the
data is more helpful in illustrating the similarity or differences of the two speeds. The
middle 50% of the Pk values for the 2,577-knot (Mach 4.0) speed lie between 0.5 and 0.
Similarly for the 2,899-knot (Mach 4.5) speed, the middle 50% lies between 0.47 and 0.
Figure 1 3 below shows very little difference over the breadth of cases run in the Pk for
the two speeds used in the ballistic missile scenarios.












Figure 13. Box Plot of Pk versus Speed For All Ballistic Missiles Aggregatedfor All




Stealth is the final independent variable discussed. Stealth is the minimization of
radar cross-section and infrared signature that most limit enemy detection opportunities.
RCS and ER signature are functions of the aspect angle with respect to the target. Stealth
is very complicated to model explicitly in EADSIM. Since this thesis is unclassified, the
detection ranges of the enemy air defense sites are altered to simulate a portion of stealth.
The 100% detection range is based on the maximum range of the air defense site. The
RCS of the LAM variants is sufficiently large, which allows the enemy air defense sites
to detect the LAM at the site's maximum range. As the detection range is decreased, the
time the LAM is in the enemy site's envelope is decreased. This models the same effect




The fitted cubic splines are almost flat, but have a small dip at the 10%
detection range in all the scenarios. Figure 14 shows that Pk remains constant for the
high scenario, but the low and medium threat scenarios appear to have small downward
trends at the 10% detection range. This suggests that over the detection ranges initially
examined, detection range does not affect missile survivability. Of course, if the
detection range is small enough, the LAM will make it through the air defenses.




















Figure 14. Pk versus Detection Range For All Cruise Missiles. LAM Survivability For




An aggregated graph of all cruise missiles for all the scenarios paints a
similar picture to Figure 14 above. It shows a relatively straight-line beginning with Pk =
0.7 at 100% detection range and declining slightly to about 0.65 at 10% detection range.
As a result of the seemingly downward trend at 10% detection range for Figure 1 4 and
the aggregated cruise missiles, extra simulation runs for the high threat scenario were run
and the results are displayed in Figure 1 5 below. The speeds for these excursion runs are
966, 1,610, and 1933 knots. The 966-knot speed is too slow to make the lower detection
range significant, but the 1,610 and 1,93 3-knot simulation runs at 1% detection range
produced Pk values of 0. We infer that the drastic change in Pk for the high threat level
scenario will also be seen in the low and medium threat scenarios since the high threat
scenario contains more in-depth air defenses in both quantity and sophistication of the
enemy air defense sites.
Pk vs Detection Ranges < 25% For Cruise Missiles

















Figure 15. Pk versus Detection Ranges of 25% and Below For Cruise Missiles in the





This section discusses the detection range independent variable in the
ballistic missile scenarios. All three threat level scenarios exhibit steady declines in Pk as
the detection ranges decrease. The low and medium threat scenarios have a 0.0 Pk value
at 10% detection range, which is obscured by the red square for the high threat scenario.
The high threat scenario, however, only declines from a 1 .0 Pk when a lofted trajectory is
applied vice a depressed trajectory. The "depressed" text in Figure 16 points out the 1.0
Pk values for the 10 and 25% detection ranges using the depressed trajectory, while the
"lofted" text shows the waterfall like decline in Pk when the 10% detection range and the
lofted trajectory are combined. As detection range decreases, the number of engagements
decrease and therefore, Pk decreases because the enemy air defense sites do not detect the
LAM as quickly and thus have less time to engage them.








Figure 16. Pk versus Detection Range For Depressed and Lofted Trajectory Ballistic




Reviewing the results for the one-dimensional analysis of the independent
variables, it is apparent that the low and medium threat cruise missile scenarios are very
similar to each other, but very different from the high threat cruise missile scenario. The
cruise missile runs show that as altitude and speed increase, LAM survivability increases
for the low and medium threat levels. Varying the stealth does not improve the
survivability of the LAM in any of the threat level scenarios unless is reduced to 1% of
the detection range, seen only in the excursion runs. The high threat scenario did not
allow any LAMs to survive unless the detection range is reduced to 1% of the maximum
range. The ballistic missile LAMs in the low and medium threat levels are more
survivable with a depressed trajectory and, naturally, a low detection range. The high
threat level scenario, however, produces survivable LAMs only if the trajectory is lofted
and the detection range is 10% or less.
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6. Altitude and Speed Interaction
Now that the independent variables have been examined individually, the two-
dimensional findings are next. The two-dimensional figures allow us to visualize
interactions between the variables. Altitude and speed is the first interaction pair
discussed. Only the cruise missile LAM variants have this interaction term because
trajectory is used as a substitute for altitude in the ballistic missile variants. All threat
levels are outlined paying particular attention to the low and medium threat level
scenarios. Tables 8 and 9 recount the altitude and speed combinations for the cruise
missile LAM variants.
Altitude (meters) 50 100 200 300 400 500 600
Altitude (meters) 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000
Table 8. Altitude Combinations For Cruise Missile LAM Variants.
Speed (knots) 460 580 966 1,610 1,933 2,255 3,221 3,544
Table 9. Speed Combinations For Cruise Missile LAM Variants.
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a) Cruise Missiles
There are several combinations of altitudes and speeds that meet the
objective of 0.2 Pk, which is the same as an 80% chance the LAM variant survives to its
target. The contour with a Pk value of 0.2 is dashed in Figure 17. The low threat scenario
combinations that meet our objective are 6,000 meters and Mach 1.5, 5,000 and 4,000
meters and Mach 2.5 and greater, 3,000 meters and Mach 3.5 and greater, and 2,000
meters and Mach 5.5. It is important to focus on the general contour shapes. The data
input are random variables and have sparse areas. Some of the fine detail is random
variation or S-Plus trying to interpolate or extrapolate the data, particularly at the
boundaries. Figure 17 below is not smooth, possibly because of randomness of the data
or different interactions that cannot be seen from this contour plot alone. It does show
the Pk values escalate rapidly as altitude decreases below 3,000 meters and speed slows







Low Threat Altitude and Speed vs Pk
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Speed (knots)
2500 3000 3500
Figure 17. Contour Plot of the Low Threat Scenario. Altitude and Speed versus /**.
LAM Survivability Increases As Altitude and Speed Increase.
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The medium threat scenario combinations that meet our objective are
6,000 meters and Mach 3.5 and greater, 5,000 meters and Mach 3.5, 5,000 meters and
Mach 5.5, 4,000 meters and Mach 5.0 and greater. It is easy to see the odd shape of the
0.2 Pk contour in the top right corner of Figure 18. Upon closer inspection of the data,
the 5,000 meters and Mach 5.0 simulation runs do have a higher P^ than the surrounding
runs. This may be easily attributed to some randomness among the data, similar to what
is discussed in the low threat scenario.
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To explain some of the randomness, a standard error, SE, calculation is
presented. SE = J ; for our example p = .2 and the number of runs, n = 30, so
'(•2)(.8)
30
= 0.073. It would not be unusual to see a result up to two standard errors from
the true value, so 0.073*2 = 0.1461. This means each Pk value can be +/- 0.1461.
Therefore, we look at the general shape of the plot, rather than the fine detail. The
contours also show that altitude does not matter when speed slows to below 1,500 knots.
Figure 1 8 indicates there is an interaction between altitude and speed.
5000
1000
Medium Threat Altitude and Speed vs Pk
500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Speed (knots)
3000 3500
Figure 18. Contour Plot of the Medium Threat Scenario. Altitude and Speed versus
Pk. LAM Survivability Increases as Altitude Increases > 3000 meters and Speed
Increases Above 1,610 knots.
The high threat scenario graph is not interesting (and thus not shown)
because all the Pk values are 1 .0. This suggests that no altitude and speed combinations
have any interaction with each other in the high threat level scenario.
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7. Trajectory and Speed Interaction (Ballistic Missiles)
This interaction is difficult to analyze. Since trajectory is only a variable in the
ballistic scenarios, there is not much data to analyze. There are only two trajectory types
and two speeds for the ballistic scenarios. Table 9 below shows the threat level of the
scenario, trajectories, speeds, and their associated summed P^ values. All the scenarios
have similar Pk values for the two speeds when the trajectory is constant. This suggests
the speed is not interacting with trajectory for the ballistic missile LAM variants.




Low Threat Depressed 0.1 0.115
Low Threat Lofted 0.1575 0.1675
Medium Threat Depressed 0.1675 0.1925
Medium Threat Lofted 0.3 0.235
High Threat Depressed 1.0 1.0
High Threat Lofted 0.35 0.34
Table 10. Trajectory, Speed, and Pk values for the Ballistic Missile LAM Variants. Low
and Medium Threat Level Scenarios have Better LAM Survivability using Depressed
Trajectories, while the High Threat Level LAM is Successful using a Lofted Trajectory.
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Figure 19 shows a box plot of all the trajectory and speed data. As in Table 9, the
two different speeds with the same trajectory have similar medians and IQRs. This
indicates that the two variables, trajectory and speed, are independent of one another and
therefore, have no interaction. The trajectory has the largest effect on Pk.



















Figure 19. Box plot ofPk versus Trajectory and Speed There is no Interaction Between
Trajectory and Speed
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7. Trajectory and Speed Interaction (Ballistic Missiles)
This interaction is difficult to analyze. Since trajectory is only a variable in the
ballistic scenarios, there is not much data to analyze. There are only two trajectory types
and two speeds for the ballistic scenarios. Table 9 below shows the threat level of the
scenario, trajectories, speeds, and their associated summed Pk values. All the scenarios
have similar Pk values for the two speeds when the trajectory is constant. This suggests
the speed is not interacting with trajectory for the ballistic missile LAM variants.




Low Threat Depressed 0.1 0.115
Low Threat Lofted 0.1575 0.1675
Medium Threat Depressed 0.1675 0.1925
Medium Threat Lofted 0.3 0.235
High Threat Depressed 1.0 1.0
High Threat Lofted 0.35 0.34
Table 10. Trajectory, Speed, and Pk values for the Ballistic Missile LAM Variants. Low
and Medium Threat Level Scenarios have Better LAM Survivability using Depressed
Trajectories, while the High Threat Level LAM is Successful using a Lofted Trajectory.
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Figure 19 shows a box plot of all the trajectory and speed data. As in Table 9, the
two different speeds with the same trajectory have similar medians and IQRs. This
indicates that the two variables, trajectory and speed, are independent of one another and
therefore, have no interaction. The trajectory has the largest effect on Pr.





















s. Altitude and Stealth Interaction
Altitude and stealth is the next interaction term to consider. It is only valid for
the cruise missile LAM variants.
a) Cruise Missiles
The smooth, straight contours of Figure 20 below, suggest that in the cases
we observed, detection range is independent of altitude, hence there is no interaction
between the two. This is to be expected since the detection range has little effect on the
LAM's survivability. The only interesting region of Figure 23 is the hump around 2.000
meters that runs the length of the detection range axis. A closer look at the data reveals
only minor differences between the Pk values of the simulation runs at 1,000 meters and
the ones at 2,000 meters. The P^ values for the runs with an altitude of 3,000 meters and
above are significantly lower than the ones using an altitude of 1,000 and 2,000 meters.
This anomaly in the graph is likely due to standard error.




























Figure 20. Contour Plot of the Low Threat Scenario. Altitude and Detection Range
versus P^ There is no Interaction Between Altitude and Detection Range.
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The contours for the medium threat scenario in Figure 2 1 below seem to
be independent, similar to the low threat scenario in Figure 20. This again suggests that
detection range does not affect the Pk when interacting with altitude. The dashed line
representing 0.2 Pk is only in the top right corner of Figure 21.
Cruise Medium Threat Altitude and Detection Range vs Pk
1000 2000 3000 4000
Altitude (meters)
5000
Figure 21. Contour Plot ofthe Medium Threat Scenario. Altitude and Detection
Range versus Pk. There is no Interaction Between Altitude and Detection Range.
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The high threat scenario illustrated in Figure 22 below, shows the only
interesting area are the results of the excursion runs completed. After the simulation
runs, any possible low Pk values are recorded only when the detection range is less than
ten percent. The contours also gravitate toward the altitude of 5,000 meters, which is the
constant altitude of the excursion runs. Thus, over the regions studied, we have not found
evidence of an interaction between altitude and stealth.




Figure 22. Contour Plot of the High Threat Scenario. Altitude and Detection Range
versus Pkfor Detection Ranges <10%.
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9. Trajectory and Stealth Interaction
This interaction is for ballistic missile LAM variants only. All three threat level
scenarios are discussed using box plots. Box plots allow each of the two trajectory and
four detection range combinations to be compared easily.
a) Ballistic Missiles
Figure 23 shows a box plot for all the trajectory and detection range
combinations. The depressed trajectory/10% detection range and the depressed
trajectory/25% detection range combinations in Figure 23 illustrate a large IQR, yet have
a median at Pk- This suggests one of the scenarios has very different values from the
others. In fact, when reviewing the raw data, the all the combinations of depressed or
lofted trajectories and 10% detection range have Pk values of 0, except the high threat
scenario. The large IQRs for all the depressed trajectory boxes in Figure 23 are because
of the steady Pk value of 1 .0 for the high threat scenario. The high threat level scenario
has lower than 1.0 Pk only when the lofted trajectory is used. While not apparent in
Figure 23, the low and medium threat scenarios have lower Pk values for the depressed
trajectories. To illustrate the scenario difference, we look at each scenario in addition to
the trajectory and detection range combinations.
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As a continuation of Figure 23 on the previous page, Figure 24 shows the
trajectory and detection range interaction for each scenario. The low threat scenario has
very low Pk values for both the lofted and depressed trajectories. The depressed
trajectory/100% detection range and the lofted trajectory/50% detection range are the
only two combinations that are consistently above the 0.2 Pk success value. This means
all the other combinations for the low threat scenario meet the 80% probability of
survival for the LAM. The combinations of depressed trajectory/10% detection range,
depressed trajectory/25% detection range, and lofted trajectory/10% detection range are
viable options in the medium threat scenario. The only option less than 0.2 Pk in the high
threat scenario is the lofted trajectory/10% detection range combination.
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Figure 24. Box plot of Pk versus Trajectory and Detection Range for Low, Medium,
and High Threat Level Scenario Ballistic Missiles.
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10. Speed and Stealth Interaction
The speed and stealth interaction is discussed for both the cruise and ballistic
missile LAM variants. Contour plots are used to discuss cruise missile LAM variants,
while box plots are displayed for the ballistic missile variants. The cruise missile LAMs
have eight different speeds depicted in Table 9 and four different detection ranges. The
ballistic missile variants, however, only have two speeds.
a) Cruise Missiles
As seen in Figure 25, detection range does not seem to matter on the
cruise missile runs in the low threat scenario. The slight decrease in the 0.2 Pk line in
Figure 25 may indicate that Pk decreases when detection range is less than ten percent
and speeds are less than 1,933 knots. Once again, the contours show that speed and
stealth are fairly independent.
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Figure 25. Contour Plot ofthe Low Threat Scenario. Speed and Detection Range
versus Pk. There is no Interaction Between Speed and Detection Range in the Low
Threat Scenario.
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In the medium threat scenario, shown in Figure 26 below, speed must be
in the 3,500 knot range, or be at least 3,221 knots and have a detection range less than or
equal to ten percent in order to fall within the 0.2 Pk area. This data seems to be more
stochastic.
Cruise Medium Threat Speed and Detection Range vs Pk
500 1000 1500 2000
Speed (knots)
2500 3000 3500
Figure 26. Contour Plot of the Medium Threat Scenario. Speed and Detection Range
versus P^ There is no Interaction Between Speed and Detection Range in the Medium
Threat Scenario.
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The high threat scenario, shown below in Figure 27, is very comparable to
Figure 22 depicting detection range and speed interactions. The excursion runs are the
only runs with a Pk of less than 1.0. A very low detection range, less than ten percent,
and speeds from 1,610 - 1,933 knots give us LAM variants with an acceptable
probability of survival as tested in this thesis. The contours are very close together
because only three speeds are used in the excursion runs. These speeds are 966, 1,610,
and 1,933 knots. The contours may extend further and straighter to the right if speeds
greater than 1,933 knots are included in the excursion testing. Therefore, we infer that
super and hypersonic LAM variants with speeds greater than 1,933 knots will also make
it through the enemy air defenses.
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Figure 27. Contour Plot of the High Threat Scenario. Speed and Detection Range
versus Pk for Detection Ranges < 10%. There is no Interaction Between Speed and




Figure 28 below is a box plot of speed and detection range versus Pk for
all the threat level scenarios. The box plot shows that every speed and detection range
combination has a wide range of Pr values. The 10% detection range boxes indicate all
of the Pr values are either or 1 .0. The 25% detection range boxes vary slightly for the
different speeds in their medians and interquartile ranges. The 50 and 100% detection
range boxes for the higher speed of 2,899 knots have lower medians and tighter IQRs.
All the relationships regarding speed and detection range indicate that there is not an
interaction taking place.
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Figure 28. Box plot of Speed and Detection Range Versus Pk For All Threat Level
Scenarios. There is no Interaction Between Speed and Detection Range.
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Figure 29 allows a closer look at each scenario for a possible speed and
detection range interaction. The box plots show each speed and detection range
combination for each threat level scenario using Mach 4.0 and 4.5 as equivalent values
for 2,577 and 2,899 knots respectively. All the speed and detection range combinations
for the low threat scenario, except the 2,899 knot/50% detection range combination, have
portions of their boxes less than or equal to Pr values of 0.2. The medium threat level
scenario combinations with 10% detection range, like the low threat scenario, have Pk
values of 0. The 50% detection range for both speeds and the 2,577-knot/100% detection
range combination have unacceptable Pk values over 0.2. The high threat scenario
combinations have Pk values greater than 0.2 with the exception of the 10% detection
range combinations. The 10% detection range combinations have, however, a range of
Pk values from to 1.0, suggesting the third independent variable, trajectory, has an
affect on these speed and detection range combinations, but speed is not interacting with
detection range.




4.0 = 2577 knots, 4.5 = 2899 knots
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Figure 29. Box plot ofSpeed and Detection Range Versus Pk For Lowy Medium, and




In the two-dimensional analysis of the independent variables above, there are
several 2-way interactions that are significant. Over the range of values examined, the
cruise missile LAM variants no interactions appear significant in the low threat scenario.
The medium threat level scenario seems to have an altitude/speed interaction, which is
verified by Figure 18. The only other interaction for the cruise missile LAMs is in the
high threat scenario. Speed and detection range contain an interaction, but this is only
seen in the excursion runs. The low and medium threat ballistic missile LAM scenarios
contain a trajectory/detection range interaction. The high threat ballistic missile scenario
contains a steady 1.0 Pk value for all depressed trajectory combinations, which will skew
any interaction that may be present. More runs may help to improve predictability of the
interactions of the independent variables in the high threat scenario.
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IV. FITTING A MODEL
All of the one and two-dimensional factors have been examined in Chapter III.
The smoothing splines fitted in Chapter III are non-parametric. The figures make it easy
to see the trends in the data. In order to back up the non-parametric smoothing spline
plots with statistics, parametric logistical regressions are run. A model is fitted for each
scenario using the "stepAIC" function, which performs a stepwise logistical regression
(Venables, 1999). Each scenario (low, medium, or high) and type (cruise or ballistic)
combination of LAM is discussed below, except the high threat level scenario/cruise
missile combination. The data for that combination is not revealing since all the Pk
values are 1.0 (no survivability). Each of the models shows which of the independent
variables are statistically significant. Each logistic regression begins with the full model
and steps both backwards and forward using the Akaike Information Criterion, AIC, as
the key measurement to a good model. Instead of using the coefficient of determination,
R", we used AIC to stop the stepwise regression iterations. AIC is concerned with the
total mean squared error (MSE) of the n fitted values for each subset regression model
and is evaluated as:
AIC = [n * log (SSEp / n)] + 2*(n-p)
SSEp is the error sum of squares for the fitted subset regression model with p
parameters, that is, p-1 predictor variables and an intercept. This technique seeks to
identify subsets of variables for which the AIC value is small. The sets of variables with
small AIC values have a small MSE, and this makes the bias and variance of the
regression model small. (MathSoft, Inc., 1999)
The t-values listed for each combination are significant in their values and sign.
Only the end model is displayed below.
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A. LOW THREAT SCENARIO
In the cruise missile scenario, altitude and speed are statistically significant for the
low threat scenario. This is displayed below with the output of the logistic model in
Table 10. The fitted logistic model is Pk ~ Altitude + Speed. The S-Plus output displays
the coefficients on each of the independent variables in the model along with their
corresponding standard error and t-value. The coefficient is the maximum likelihood
estimator for the variable. A positive coefficient for altitude or speed indicates as they
are increased, the Pk values decrease. The standard error is the error associated with
estimating the coefficients and the t-value indicates how statistically significant, with
greater absolute values indicating greater significance. If the variable is not significant,




Value Std. Error t value
(Intercept) -3 3706006748 09455973415 -35 64520
Altitude 0006839912 00002417238 28 29640
Speed 0012509299 00004570605 27 36903
Table 11. Logistic Model For the Low Threat Cruise Missile Scenario. As Altitude and
Speed Increase, so does LAM Survivability.
In the ballistic missile scenario, trajectory, detection range, and the
trajectory/detection range interaction are significant. This is shown statistically below
with the output of the logistic model in Table 11. Because trajectory only has two
factors, depressed or lofted, the negative coefficient indicates Pk values decrease if a
depressed trajectory is used. Similarly, as the detection range decreases, so does Pk- The
fitted logistic model is Pk ~ Trajectory + Detection Range + Trajectory:Detection Range.
A semi-colon between two variables in a fitted logistic model indicates an interaction
between these two variables.
Coefficients
:
Value Std. Error t value
(Intercept) 2 944126298 0.305417857 9.639667
Trajectory -0 872450186 0.305417857 -2.856579
DR -0 018646157 0.004091081 -4.557758
Trajectory :DR 009956635 0.004091081 2.433742
Table 12. Logistic Model For the Low Threat Ballistic Missile Scenario. Depressed
Trajectory, Lower Detection Ranges and the Trajectory/Detection Range Interaction
are Important Factors in the Model.
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B. MEDIUM THREAT SCENARIO
In the medium threat cruise missile scenario, altitude, speed, detection range, the
speed/detection range interaction, and the altitude/speed interaction are shown to be
significant in the survivability of the LAM. This is outlined statistically below with the
output of the logistic model in Table 12. The model is Pk ~ Altitude + Speed + Detection
Range + Speed:Detection Range + Altitude:Detection Range.
Coefficients
:
Value Std. Error t: value
(Intercept) -4 708491e+000 2 129351e-001 -22 112333
Altitude 3 953237e-004 4 818964e-005 8 203500
Speed 1 542415e-003 9 496273e-005 16 242316
DR 3 388468e-003 2 761280e-003 1 227136
Speed : DR -3 825659e-006 1 213947e-006 -3 151423
Altitude:Speed 3 705124e-008 2 353410e-008 1 574364
Table 13. Logistic Model For the Medium Threat Cruise Missile Scenario. Altitude
and Speed are Important Factors in the Model.
In the ballistic missile scenario, trajectory, detection range, and the
trajectory/detection range interaction are significant. This is identical to the low threat
ballistic missile scenario and is shown below in Table 13. The fitted logistic model is Pk
~ Trajectory + Detection Range + Trajectory:Detection Range.
Coefficients
:
Value Std. Error t value
(Intercept) 2 63032268 0.263344301 9.988151
Trajectory -1 12879041 0.263344301 -4.286367
DR -0 02424414 0.003576827 -6.778115
Trajectory: DR 01422279 0.003576827 3.976370
Table 14. Logistic Model For the Medium Threat Ballistic Missile Scenario.
Trajectory, Detection Range and the Trajectory/Detection Range Interaction are
Important Factors in the Model.
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c. HIGH THREAT SCENARIO
In the high threat cruise missile scenario, none of the independent variables are
significant. In fact, all the P^ values are 1.0. In the ballistic missile scenario trajectory
and detection range are statistically significant. This is displayed below in Table 14 with




Value Std. Error t value
(Intercept) -5 1929405 12.945831526 -0 4011284
Trajectory 6 9778226 12.944857168 5390421
DR -0 0231681 0.004252713 -5 4478409
Table 15. Logistic Model For the High Threat Ballistic Missile Scenario. Trajectory,
and Detection Range are Significant.
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D. ALL THREAT LEVEL SCENARIOS
The stepwise logistical regression did not work for the aggregated cruise or
ballistic missile scenarios. Pk values in the high threat scenarios make it impossible to
determine a coefficient value that has a low standard error. To determine if the threat
level is significant, a sign test is run. All the models are identical except for the threat
level. If the threat level is insignificant, we would expect the calculated probability of
kill, Pk, to be equally likely to be greater for each threat level. That is, with no threat
difference, the number of combinations where the high threat level is greater than the
medium, for example, should be binomially distributed with n = # of combinations,
excluding ties, and p = 0.5. This hypothesis is checked with a sign test. The null
hypothesis is Ho: p = .5 and the alternative hypothesis is Ha : p > .5 (Devore, 1995).
Accepting the null hypothesis means that the threat level of the scenario does not matter.
On the other hand, accepting the alternative hypothesis means the threat level of the
scenario does matter. The p-value calculations are compared to the significance level of
0.05, and are displayed in Table 15 below.
High vs Medium Medium vs Low
Cruise Missile Scenarios < 0.001 < 0.001
Ballistic Missile Scenarios 0.006 0.002
Table 16. P-value Results For High vs Medium and Medium vs Low Sign Tests to
Determine if Threat Level is Highly Significant.
Based on the p-values in Table 15, we reject the null hypothesis in favor of the
alternative. The sign test confirms that the threat level does matter and validates the
design of the scenarios, which increasing in sophistication from low to high.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Conclusions for each of the scenarios are presented separately, then for
aggregated cruise and ballistic missiles. For all of the scenarios, we assume an alerted
threat with a perfect state of readiness for enemy air defense sites. All the combinations
that have a probability of survival of 80% (Pk values less than or equal to 0.2) are listed in
Appendices C and D.
A. LOW THREAT SCENARIO
The low threat is vulnerable to both cruise and ballistic missile LAM variants. As
altitude and speed variables increase, the probability the LAM is killed by an enemy air
defense site, Pk, decreases in the cruise missile variants, supported by Figures 8 & 1 1 and
Table 1 1 . The most preferred ballistic missile variants in the low threat scenario have a
depressed trajectory and a small detection range, as demonstrated in Figures 6 &16 and
Table 12. As expected, many combinations of cruise and ballistic missiles penetrate the
enemy air defenses in the low threat scenario.
B. MEDIUM THREAT SCENARIO
In the medium threat scenario the acceptable cruise missile LAM variants fly
above 3,000 meters and at least 1,933 knots. The fitted logistical model in Table 13
supports the smoothing spline plot in Figures 8 & 1 1. As altitude and speed increase, the
survivability of the LAM increases for the medium threat level cruise missiles. The
ballistic missile variants, like the low threat scenario, are more survivable when the LAM
variant has a depressed trajectory and a low detection range, as shown in Figures 6 & 16
and fitted in Table 14.
C. HIGH THREAT SCENARIO
The high threat scenario presents many problems for cruise and ballistic missile
LAMs. A majority of the Pk values for both cruise and ballistic missiles are 1.0. The
alerted, modern, integrated air defense is only penetrated by very stealthy cruise missiles
with a detection range value of 1% and a speed of at least 1,933 knots, depressed
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trajectory ballistic missiles with a detection range value less than 10%, or lofted
trajectory ballistic missiles.
D. ALL CRUISE MISSILES
In the low and medium threat scenario, higher altitudes and faster speeds increase
the probability of survival for the LAM variants. In the high threat scenario, only
excursion runs with an extremely low detection range of 1% make it through the air
defenses.
E. ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES
The ballistic missile LAM variants are successful in the low and medium threat
scenarios when the detection range is 50% or lower for depressed trajectories, or when a
lofted trajectory is used. The high threat scenario is only defeated when the LAM has a
lofted trajectory and a detection range of 10% or lower. Speed is not a factor in the
ballistic missile LAMs examined.
F. SUMMARY
The high threat scenario proves to be the most difficult set of air defenses to
penetrate. This is not surprising, but does indicate that a sophisticated missile must be
used to achieve successful target destruction. The sign test confirms that the threat level
of the scenario does make a difference in the success, or failure, of the LAM. The most
survivable cruise missile LAM variants have an altitude of at least 4,000 meters, speed of
at least 1,610 knots (Mach 2.3), and stealthy enough to limit the enemy air defense site
detection range to 1% of its maximum range. Survivable ballistic missile LAM variants
have a lofted trajectory, speed in the 2,577 knot (Mach 4.0) range, and stealthy enough to
limit the enemy air defense site detection range to 10% of its maximum range.
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APPENDIX A. CRUISE MISSILE RUN MATRIX










































































Table 17. Cruise Missile Run Matrix
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APPENDIX B. BALLISTIC MISSILE RUN MATRIX
Ballistic Missile Run Matrix
BALLISTIC (DEPRESSED TRAJECTORY)
Scenario Speed (Mach) (Knots) (M/s) Apogee Altitude (ft) (m) Dive angle
Low 4 2577 1326 97,733 29,789 25
Low 4.5 2899 1492 105,396 32,125 25
Medium 4 2577 1326 82,634 25,187 23
Medium 4.5 2899 1492 85,971 26,204 23
High 4 2577 1326 108,365 33,030 20
High 4.5 2899 1492 108,592 33,099 20
BALLISTIC (LOFTED TRAJECTORY)
Scenario Speed (Mach) (Knots) (M/s) Apogee Altitude (mi) (m) Dive angle
Low 4 2577 1326 388 624,385 83
Low 4.5 2899 1492 386 620,723 83
Medium 4 2577 1326 306 492,561 80
Medium 4.5 2899 1492 304 489,086 80
High 4 2577 1326 504 810,715 80
High 4.5 2899 1492 501 806,254 80
Table 18. Ballistic Missile Run Matrix
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APPENDIX C. SUCCESSFUL LAND ATTACK CRUISE MISSILES
Scenario Altitude Speed PR Ek
Low 1000 3221 25 0.166667
Low 1000 3544 10 0.166667
Low 1000 3544 25 0.2
Low 2000 2255 25 0.066667
Low 2000 3544 50 0.033333
Low 2000 3544 100 0.1
Low 2000 3544 10 0.1
Low 2000 3544 25 0.133333
Low 3000 966 50 0.2
Low 3000 1610 100 0.166667
Low 3000 1610 50 0.2
Low 3000 1933 100 0.1
Low 3000 1933 25 0.133333
Low 3000 1933 10 0.133333
Low 3000 2255 100 0.1
Low 3000 2255 50 0.166667
Low 3000 2255 10 0.166667
Low 3000 3221 10
Low 3000 3221 100 0.033333
Low 3000 3221 25 0.033333
Low 3000 3221 50 0.1
Low 3000 3544 50 0.033333
Low 3000 3544 25 0.033333
Low 3000 3544 100 0.1
Low 3000 3544 10 0.1
Low 4000 1610 25 0.1
Low 4000 1610 50 0.133333
Low 4000 1610 10 0.133333
Low 4000 1610 100 0.2
Low 4000 1933 25
Low 4000 1933 10
Low 4000 1933 100 0.066667
Low 4000 1933 50 0.1
Low 4000 2255 100
Low 4000 2255 50
Low 4000 2255 25
Low 4000 2255 10
Low 4000 3221 100
Low 4000 3221 10
Low 4000 3221 25 0.033333
Low 4000 3221 50 0.1
Low 4000 3544 100
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Low 4000 3544 50
Low 4000 3544 25
Low 4000 3544 10
Low 5000 966 25 0.133333
Low 5000 966 100 0.166667
Low 5000 1610 10 0.066667
Low 5000 1610 25 0.133333
Low 5000 1933 50 0.033333
Low 5000 1933 100 0.1
Low 5000 1933 10 0.1
Low 5000 1933 25 0.166667
Low 5000 2255 25
Low 5000 2255 10
Low 5000 2255 50 0.066667
Low 5000 2255 100 0.1
Low 5000 3221 100
Low 5000 3221 50
Low 5000 3221 25
Low 5000 3221 10
Low 5000 3544 100
Low 5000 3544 50
Low 5000 3544 25
Low 5000 3544 10
Low 6000 966 10 0.1
Low 6000 966 25 0.133333
Low 6000 966 100 0.2
Low 6000 1610 100 0.133333
Low 6000 1610 50 0.133333
Low 6000 1933 100 0.066667
Low 6000 1933 50 0.066667
Low 6000 1933 10 0.1
Low 6000 1933 25 0.133333
Low 6000 2255 100 0.066667
Low 6000 2255 10 0.066667
Low 6000 2255 25 0.166667
Low 6000 2255 50 0.2
Low 6000 3221 100
Low 6000 3221 50
Low 6000 3221 25
Low 6000 3221 10
Low 6000 3544 100
Low 6000 3544 50
Low 6000 3544 25
Low 6000 3544 10
Medium 3000 3544 10 0.033333
Medium 3000 3544 25 0.2



































Table 19. Successful Land Attack Cruise Missiles For All Threat Level Scenarios.
4000 1933 10 0.066667
4000 1933 100 0.2
4000 2255 10 0.1
4000 3221 50
4000 3221 10 0.033333
4000 3221 100 0.1
4000 3221 25 0.133333
4000 3544 10
4000 3544 100 0.066667
4000 3544 50 0.066667
5000 1933 10
5000 1933 50 0.2
5000 2255 50 0.166667
5000 2255 10 0.166667
5000 3544 10
5000 3544 100 0.133333
5000 3544 25 0.133333
5000 3544 50 0.2
6000 1933 10 0.166667
6000 2255 50 0.133333
6000 2255 100 0.166667
6000 2255 25 0.166667




6000 3221 100 0.033333
6000 3544 25
6000 3544 10
6000 3544 50 0.133333





APPENDIX D. SUCCESSFUL LAND ATTACK BALLISTIC MISSILES
Scenario Trajectory Speed PR Ilk
Low Depressed 2577 50 0.166667
Low Depressed 2577 25
Low Depressed 2577 10
Low Depressed 2899 25
Low Depressed 2899 10
Low Lofted 2577 25 0.2
Low Lofted 2577 100 0.133333
Low Lofted 2577 10
Low Lofted 2899 100 0.2
Low Lofted 2899 25 0.2
Low Lofted 2899 10
Medium Depressed 2577 25
Medium Depressed 2577 10
Medium Depressed 2899 25
Medium Depressed 2899 10
Medium Lofted 2577 10
Medium Lofted 2899 100 0.2
Medium Lofted 2899 10
High Lofted 2577 10
High Lofted 2899 10
Table 20. Successful Land Attack Ballistic Missiles For All Threat Level Scenarios,
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APPENDIX E. COMPLETE CRUISE MISSILE DATA SET
Scenario Altitude Speed DR P k
Low 50 420 100 1
Low 50 420 50 1
Low 50 420 25 1
Low 50 420 10 1
Low 50 580 100 0.8
Low 50 580 50 0.933333
Low 50 580 25 0.933333
Low 50 580 10 0.966667
Low 100 420 100 1
Low 100 420 50 1
Low 100 420 25 1
Low 100 420 10 0.966667
Low 100 580 100 0.933333
Low 100 580 50 1
Low 100 580 25 0.966667
Low 100 580 10 0.933333
Low 200 420 100 0.966667
Low 200 420 50 1
Low 200 420 25 1
Low 200 420 10 0.966667
Low 200 580 100 0.833333
Low 200 580 50 0.9
Low 200 580 25 0.966667
Low 200 580 10 0.933333
Low 300 420 100 1
Low 300 420 50 1
Low 300 420 25 0.966667
Low 300 420 10 1
Low 300 580 100 0.966667
Low 300 580 50 0.966667
Low 300 580 25 0.966667
Low 300 580 10 0.933333
Low 400 420 100 1
Low 400 420 50 1
Low 400 420 25 1
Low 400 420 10 0.966667
Low 400 580 100 0.9
Low 400 580 50 0.966667
Low 400 580 25 0.933333
Low 400 580 10 0.9
Low 500 420 100 1
Low 500 420 50 1
Low 500 420 25 1
Low 500 420 10 0.966667
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Low 500 580 100 0.8
Low 500 580 50 0.866667
Low 500 580 25 0.933333
Low 500 580 10 0.933333
Low 600 420 100 0.966667
Low 600 420 50 1
Low 600 420 25 1
Low 600 420 10 1
Low 600 580 100 0.933333
Low 600 580 50 0.866667
Low 600 580 25 0.933333
Low 600 580 10 0.766667
Low 1000 966 100 0.7
Low 1000 966 50 0.666667
Low 1000 966 25 0.866667
Low 1000 966 10 0.733333
Low 1000 1610 100 0.633333
Low 1000 1610 50 0.6
Low 1000 1610 25 0.366667
Low 1000 1610 10 0.566667
Low 1000 1933 100 0.466667
Low 1000 1933 50 0.6
Low 1000 1933 25 0.5
Low 1000 1933 10 0.3
Low 1000 2255 100 0.466667
Low 1000 2255 50 0.466667
Low 1000 2255 25 0.333333
Low 1000 2255 10 0.433333
Low 1000 3221 100 0.333333
Low 1000 3221 50 0.266667
Low 1000 3221 25 0.166667
Low 1000 3221 10 0.3
Low 1000 3554 100 0.233333
Low 1000 3554 50 0.233333
Low 1000 3554 25 0.2
Low 1000 3554 10 0.166667
Low 2000 966 100 0.733333
Low 2000 966 50 0.666667
Low 2000 966 25 0.566667
Low 2000 966 10 0.566667
Low 2000 1610 100 0.3
Low 2000 1610 50 0.433333
Low 2000 1610 25 0.433333
Low 2000 1610 10 0.5
Low 2000 1933 100 0.466667
Low 2000 1933 50 0.466667
Low 2000 1933 25 0.566667
Low 2000 1933 10 0.4
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Low 2000 2255 100 0.4
Low 2000 2255 50 0.233333
Low 2000 2255 25 0.066667
Low 2000 2255 10 0.3
Low 2000 3221 100 0.233333
Low 2000 3221 50 0.366667
Low 2000 3221 25 0.366667
Low 2000 3221 10 0.266667
Low 2000 3554 100 0.1
Low 2000 3554 50 0.033333
Low 2000 3554 25 0.133333
Low 2000 3554 10 0.1
Low 3000 966 100 0.433333
Low 3000 966 50 0.2
Low 3000 966 25 0.466667
Low 3000 966 10 0.4
Low 3000 1610 100 0.166667
Low 3000 1610 50 0.2
Low 3000 1610 25 0.333333
Low 3000 1610 10 0.366667
Low 3000 1933 100 0.1
Low 3000 1933 50 0.266667
Low 3000 1933 25 0.133333
Low 3000 1933 10 0.133333
Low 3000 2255 100 0.1
Low 3000 2255 50 0.166667
Low 3000 2255 25 0.233333
Low 3000 2255 10 0.166667
Low 3000 3221 100 0.033333
Low 3000 3221 50 0.1
Low 3000 3221 25 0.033333
Low 3000 3221 10
Low 3000 3554 100 0.1
Low 3000 3554 50 0.033333
Low 3000 3554 25 0.033333
Low 3000 3554 10 0.1
Low 4000 966 100 0.433333
Low 4000 966 50 0.4
Low 4000 966 25 0.3
Low 4000 966 10 0.266667
Low 4000 1610 100 0.2
Low 4000 1610 50 0.133333
Low 4000 1610 25 0.1
Low 4000 1610 10 0.133333
Low 4000 1933 100 0.066667
Low 4000 1933 50 0.1
Low 4000 1933 25
Low 4000 1933 10
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Low 4000 2255 100
Low 4000 2255 50
Low 4000 2255 25
Low 4000 2255 10
Low 4000 3221 100
Low 4000 3221 50 0.1
Low 4000 3221 25 0.033333
Low 4000 3221 10
Low 4000 3554 100
Low 4000 3554 50
Low 4000 3554 25
Low 4000 3554 10
Low 5000 966 100 0.166667
Low 5000 966 50 0.233333
Low 5000 966 25 0.133333
Low 5000 966 10 0.233333
Low 5000 1610 100 0.233333
Low 5000 1610 50 0.266667
Low 5000 1610 25 0.133333
Low 5000 1610 10 0.066667
Low 5000 1933 100 0.1
Low 5000 1933 50 0.033333
Low 5000 1933 25 0.166667
Low 5000 1933 10 0.1
Low 5000 2255 100 0.1
Low 5000 2255 50 0.066667
Low 5000 2255 25
Low 5000 2255 10
Low 5000 3221 100
Low 5000 3221 50
Low 5000 3221 25
Low 5000 3221 10
Low 5000 3554 100
Low 5000 3554 50
Low 5000 3554 25
Low 5000 3554 10
Low 6000 966 100 0.2
Low 6000 966 50 0.333333
Low 6000 966 25 0.133333
Low 6000 966 10 0.1
Low 6000 1610 100 0.133333
Low 6000 1610 50 0.133333
Low 6000 1610 25 0.233333
Low 6000 1610 10 0.266667
Low 6000 1933 100 0.066667
Low 6000 1933 50 0.066667
Low 6000 1933 25 0.133333
Low 6000 1933 10 0.1
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Low 6000 2255 100 0.066667
Low 6000 2255 50 0.2
Low 6000 2255 25 0.166667
Low 6000 2255 10 0.066667
Low 6000 3221 100
Low 6000 3221 50
Low 6000 3221 25
Low 6000 3221 10
Low 6000 3554 100
Low 6000 3554 50
Low 6000 3554 25
Low 6000 3554 10
Medium 50 420 100 1
Medium 50 420 50 1
Medium 50 420 25 1
Medium 50 420 10 1
Medium 50 580 100 1
Medium 50 580 50 1
Medium 50 580 25 1
Medium 50 580 10 1
Medium 100 420 100 1
Medium 100 420 50 1
Medium 100 420 25 1
Medium 100 420 10 1
Medium 100 580 100 1
Medium 100 580 50 1
Medium 100 580 25 1
Medium 100 580 10 1
Medium 200 420 100 1
Medium 200 420 50 1
Medium 200 420 25 1
Medium 200 420 10 1
Medium 200 580 100 1
Medium 200 580 50 1
Medium 200 580 25 1
Medium 200 580 10 1
Medium 300 420 100 0.933333
Medium 300 420 50 1
Medium 300 420 25 1
Medium 300 420 10 1
Medium 300 580 100 1
Medium 300 580 50 1
Medium 300 580 25 1
Medium 300 580 10 1
Medium 400 420 100 1
Medium 400 420 50 1
Medium 400 420 25 1
Medium 400 420 10 1
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Medium 400 580 100 1
Medium 400 580 50 1
Medium 400 580 25 1
Medium 400 580 10 1
Medium 500 420 100 1
Medium 500 420 50 1
Medium 500 420 25 1
Medium 500 420 10 1
Medium 500 580 100 1
Medium 500 580 50 1
Medium 500 580 25 1
Medium 500 580 10 1
Medium 600 420 100 1
Medium 600 420 50 1
Medium 600 420 25 1
Medium 600 420 10 1
Medium 600 580 100 1
Medium 600 580 50 1
Medium 600 580 25 1
Medium 600 580 10 1
Medium 1000 966 100 1
Medium 1000 966 50 1
Medium 1000 966 25 1
Medium 1000 966 10 1
Medium 1000 1610 100 0.766667
Medium 1000 1610 50 0.666667
Medium 1000 1610 25 0.7
Medium 1000 1610 10 0.633333
Medium 1000 1933 100 0.666667
Medium 1000 1933 50 0.833333
Medium 1000 1933 25 0.733333
Medium 1000 1933 10 0.533333
Medium 1000 2255 100 0.533333
Medium 1000 2255 50 0.7
Medium 1000 2255 25 0.566667
Medium 1000 2255 10 0.466667
Medium 1000 3221 100 0.666667
Medium 1000 3221 50 0.3
Medium 1000 3221 25 0.333333
Medium 1000 3221 10 0.266667
Medium 1000 3544 100 0.266667
Medium 1000 3544 50 0.333333
Medium 1000 3544 25 0.5
Medium 1000 3544 10 0.5
Medium 2000 966 100 1
Medium 2000 966 50 1
Medium 2000 966 25 1
Medium 2000 966 10 1
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Medium 2000 1610 100 0.833333
Medium 2000 1610 50 0.633333
Medium 2000 1610 25 0.866667
Medium 2000 1610 10 0.6
Medium 2000 1933 100 0.666667
Medium 2000 1933 50 0.633333
Medium 2000 1933 25 0.6
Medium 2000 1933 10 0.633333
Medium 2000 2255 100 0.633333
Medium 2000 2255 50 0.466667
Medium 2000 2255 25 0.6
Medium 2000 2255 10 0.666667
Medium 2000 3221 100 0.533333
Medium 2000 3221 50 0.533333
Medium 2000 3221 25 0.366667
Medium 2000 3221 10 0.333333
Medium 2000 3544 100 0.5
Medium 2000 3544 50 0.366667
Medium 2000 3544 25 0.4
Medium 2000 3544 10 0.333333
Medium 3000 966 100 1
Medium 3000 966 50 1
Medium 3000 966 25 1
Medium 3000 966 10 1
Medium 3000 1610 100 0.466667
Medium 3000 1610 50 0.5
Medium 3000 1610 25 0.633333
Medium 3000 1610 10 0.566667
Medium 3000 1933 100 0.433333
Medium 3000 1933 50 0.666667
Medium 3000 1933 25 0.633333
Medium 3000 1933 10 0.4
Medium 3000 2255 100 0.533333
Medium 3000 2255 50 0.4
Medium 3000 2255 25 0.366667
Medium 3000 2255 10 0.266667
Medium 3000 3221 100 0.433333
Medium 3000 3221 50 0.466667
Medium 3000 3221 25 0.3
Medium 3000 3221 10 0.333333
Medium 3000 3544 100 0.3
Medium 3000 3544 50 0.266667
Medium 3000 3544 25 0.2
Medium 3000 3544 10 0.033333
Medium 4000 966 100 1
Medium 4000 966 50 1
Medium 4000 966 25 1
Medium 4000 966 10 1
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Medium 4000 1610 100 0.4
Medium 4000 1610 50 0.366667
Medium 4000 1610 25 0.466667
Medium 4000 1610 10 0.2
Medium 4000 1933 100 0.2
Medium 4000 1933 50 0.4
Medium 4000 1933 25 0.466667
Medium 4000 1933 10 0.066667
Medium 4000 2255 100 0.266667
Medium 4000 2255 50 0.3
Medium 4000 2255 25 0.266667
Medium 4000 2255 10 0.1
Medium 4000 3221 100 0.1
Medium 4000 3221 50
Medium 4000 3221 25 0.133333
Medium 4000 3221 10 0.033333
Medium 4000 3544 100 0.066667
Medium 4000 3544 50 0.066667
Medium 4000 3544 25 0.233333
Medium 4000 3544 10
Medium 5000 966 100 1
Medium 5000 966 50 1
Medium 5000 966 25 1
Medium 5000 966 10 1
Medium 5000 1610 100 0.5
Medium 5000 1610 50 0.4
Medium 5000 1610 25 0.266667
Medium 5000 1610 10 0.3
Medium 5000 1933 100 0.3
Medium 5000 1933 50 0.2
Medium 5000 1933 25 0.3
Medium 5000 1933 10
Medium 5000 2255 100 0.333333
Medium 5000 2255 50 0.166667
Medium 5000 2255 25 0.266667
Medium 5000 2255 10 0.166667
Medium 5000 3221 100 0.5
Medium 5000 3221 50 0.433333
Medium 5000 3221 25 0.3
Medium 5000 3221 10 0.233333
Medium 5000 3544 100 0.133333
Medium 5000 3544 50 0.2
Medium 5000 3544 25 0.133333
Medium 5000 3544 10
Medium 6000 966 100 1
Medium 6000 966 50 1
Medium 6000 966 25 1
Medium 6000 966 10 1
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Medium 6000 1610 100 0.3
Medium 6000 1610 50 0.4
Medium 6000 1610 25 0.3
Medium 6000 1610 10 0.266667
Medium 6000 1933 100 0.266667
Medium 6000 1933 50 0.266667
Medium 6000 1933 25 0.333333
Medium 6000 1933 10 0.166667
Medium 6000 2255 100 0.166667
Medium 6000 2255 50 0.133333
Medium 6000 2255 25 0.166667
Medium 6000 2255 10 0.166667
Medium 6000 3221 100 0.033333
Medium 6000 3221 50
Medium 6000 3221 25
Medium 6000 3221 10
Medium 6000 3544 100 0.166667
Medium 6000 3544 50 0.133333
Medium 6000 3544 25
Medium 6000 3544 10
High 50 420 100 1
High 50 420 50 1
High 50 420 25 1
High 50 420 10 1
High 50 580 100 1
High 50 580 50 1
High 50 580 25 1
High 50 580 10 1
High 100 420 100 1
High 100 420 50 1
High 100 420 25 1
High 100 420 10 1
High 100 580 100 1
High 100 580 50 1
High 100 580 25 1
High 100 580 10 1
High 200 420 100 1
High 200 420 50 1
High 200 420 25 1
High 200 420 10 1
High 200 580 100 1
High 200 580 50 1
High 200 580 25 1
High 200 580 10 1
High 300 420 100 1
High 300 420 50 1
High 300 420 25 1
High 300 420 10 1
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High 300 580 100 1
High 300 580 50 1
High 300 580 25 1
High 300 580 10 1
High 400 420 100 1
High 400 420 50 1
High 400 420 25 1
High 400 420 10 1
High 400 580 100 1
High 400 580 50 1
High 400 580 25 1
High 400 580 10 1
High 500 420 100 1
High 500 420 50 1
High 500 420 25 1
High 500 420 10 1
High 500 580 100 1
High 500 580 50 1
High 500 580 25 1
High 500 580 10 1
High 600 420 100 1
High 600 420 50 1
High 600 420 25 1
High 600 420 10 1
High 600 580 100 1
High 600 580 50 1
High 600 580 25 1
High 600 580 10 1
High 1000 966 100 1
High 1000 966 50 1
High 1000 966 25 1
High 1000 966 10 1
High 1000 1610 100 1
High 1000 1610 50 1
High 1000 1610 25 1
High 1000 1610 10 1
High 1000 1933 100 1
High 1000 1933 50 1
High 1000 1933 25 1
High 1000 1933 10 1
High 1000 2255 100 1
High 1000 2255 50 1
High 1000 2255 25 1
High 1000 2255 10 1
High 1000 3221 100 1
High 1000 3221 50 1
High 1000 3221 25 1
High 1000 3221 10 0.966667
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High 1000 3544 100 1
High 1000 3544 50 1
High 1000 3544 25 1
High 1000 3544 10 1
High 2000 966 100 1
High 2000 966 50 1
High 2000 966 25 1
High 2000 966 10 1
High 2000 1610 100 1
High 2000 1610 50 1
High 2000 1610 25 1
High 2000 1610 10 1
High 2000 1933 100 1
High 2000 1933 50 1
High 2000 1933 25 1
High 2000 1933 10 1
High 2000 2255 100 1
High 2000 2255 50 1
High 2000 2255 25 1
High 2000 2255 10 1
High 2000 3221 100 1
High 2000 3221 50 1
High 2000 3221 25 1
High 2000 3221 10 1
High 2000 3544 100 1
High 2000 3544 50 1
High 2000 3544 25 1
High 2000 3544 10 1
High 3000 966 100 1
High 3000 966 50 1
High 3000 966 25 1
High 3000 966 10 1
High 3000 1610 100 1
High 3000 1610 50 1
High 3000 1610 25 1
High 3000 1610 10 1
High 3000 1933 100 1
High 3000 1933 50 1
High 3000 1933 25 1
High 3000 1933 10 1
High 3000 2255 100 1
High 3000 2255 50 1
High 3000 2255 25 1
High 3000 2255 10 1
High 3000 3221 100 1
High 3000 3221 50 1
High 3000 3221 25 1
High 3000 3221 10 1
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High 3000 3544 100 1
High 3000 3544 50 1
High 3000 3544 25 1
High 3000 3544 10 1
High 4000 966 100 1
High 4000 966 50 1
High 4000 966 25 1
High 4000 966 10 1
High 4000 1610 100 1
High 4000 1610 50 1
High 4000 1610 25 1
High 4000 1610 10 1
High 4000 1933 100 1
High 4000 1933 50 1
High 4000 1933 25 1
High 4000 1933 10 1
High 4000 2255 100 1
High 4000 2255 50 1
High 4000 2255 25 1
High 4000 2255 10 1
High 4000 3221 100 1
High 4000 3221 50 1
High 4000 3221 25 1
High 4000 3221 10 1
High 4000 3544 100 1
High 4000 3544 50 1
High 4000 3544 25 1
High 4000 3544 10 1
High 5000 966 100 1
High 5000 966 50 1
High 5000 966 25 1
High 5000 966 10 1
High 5000 966 1 1
High 5000 1610 100 1
High 5000 1610 50 1
High 5000 1610 25 1
High 5000 1610 10 1
High 5000 1610 5 0.966667
High 5000 1610 3 1
High 5000 1610 1
High 5000 1933 100 1
High 5000 1933 50 1
High 5000 1933 25 1
High 5000 1933 10 1
High 5000 1933 5 1
High 5000 1933 3 1
High 5000 1933 1
High 5000 2255 100 1
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High 5000 2255 50 1
High 5000 2255 25 1
High 5000 2255 10 1
High 5000 3221 100 1
High 5000 3221 50 1
High 5000 3221 25 1
High 5000 3221 10 1
High 5000 3544 100 1
High 5000 3544 50 1
High 5000 3544 25 1
High 5000 3544 10 1
High 6000 966 100 1
High 6000 966 50 1
High 6000 966 25 1
High 6000 966 10 1
High 6000 1610 100 1
High 6000 1610 50 1
High 6000 1610 25 1
High 6000 1610 10 1
High 6000 1933 100 1
High 6000 1933 50 1
High 6000 1933 25 1
High 6000 1933 10 1
High 6000 2255 100 1
High 6000 2255 50 1
High 6000 2255 25 1
High 6000 2255 10 1
High 6000 3221 100 1
High 6000 3221 50 1
High 6000 3221 25 1
High 6000 3221 10 1
High 6000 3544 100 1
High 6000 3544 50 1
High 6000 3544 25 1
High 6000 3544 10 1
Table 21. Complete Cruise Missile Data Set For All Threat Level Scenarios.
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APPENDIX F. COMPLETE BALLISTIC MISSILE DATA SET
Scenario > Trajectory Speed DR Ek
Low Depressed 2577 100 0.233333
Low Depressed 2577 50 0.166667
Low Depressed 2577 25
Low Depressed 2577 10
Low Depressed 2899 100 0.233333
Low Depressed 2899 50 0.233333
Low Depressed 2899 25
Low Depressed 2899 10
Low Lofted 2577 100 0.133333
Low Lofted 2577 50 0.3
Low Lofted 2577 25 0.2
Low Lofted 2577 10
Low Lofted 2899 100 0.2
Low Lofted 2899 50 0.266667
Low Lofted 2899 25 0.2
Low Lofted 2899 10
Table 22. Data Set For the Low Threat Ballistic Missile Scenario.
Scenario i Trajectory Speed DR Ek
Medium Depressed 2577 100 0.466667
Medium Depressed 2577 50 0.266667
Medium Depressed 2577 25
Medium Depressed 2577 10
Medium Depressed 2899 100 0.466667
Medium Depressed 2899 50 0.3
Medium Depressed 2899 25
Medium Depressed 2899 10
Medium Lofted 2577 100 0.366667
Medium Lofted 2577 50 0.5
Medium Lofted 2577 25 0.333333
Medium Lofted 2577 10
Medium Lofted 2899 100 0.2
Medium Lofted 2899 50 0.366667
Medium Lofted 2899 25 0.366667
Medium Lofted 2899 10
Table 23. Data Set For the Medium Threat Ballistic Missile Scenario.
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Scenario Trajectory Speed DR LM
High Depressed 2577 100
High Depressed 2577 50
High Depressed 2577 25
High Depressed 2577 10
High Depressed 2899 100
High Depressed 2899 50
High Depressed 2899 25
High Depressed 2899 10
High Lofted 2577 100 0.6
High Lofted 2577 50 0.533333
High Lofted 2577 25 0.266667
High Lofted 2577 10
High Lofted 2899 100 0.533333
High Lofted 2899 50 0.333333
High Lofted 2899 25 0.5
High Lofted 2899 10
Table 24. Data Set For the High Threat Ballistic Missile Scenario.
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